. States must also indicate how both schools and school districts will demonstrate Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) towards full proficiency by 2014 and make public their test results. This performance data will also be disaggregated according to different student sub-groups, characterised by students' sex, minority group, Special Educational Need, level of economic disadvantage and English language proficiency.
Typically, a subgroup would comprise 25 students, although states do vary in their ). In addition to annual testing, schools must also ensure that at least 95% of all students are assessed. If this target is not met, then schools will not make AYP, regardless of the proficiency scores of the remainder of the cohort (Popham 2004) . If a school fails to make AYP, a series of sanctions can be administered by the school district. The form of these sanctions ranges from district level monitoring through to giving parents the option to transfer their children out of 'failing' schools and providing students who remain in the school with additional tutoring. In more extreme cases, where a school fails to make AYP for four or more consecutive years, that school can be faced with having to replace staff, aspects of the curriculum or, at the extreme, be re-structured as a Charter school or one run by a private company.
'Compassionate conservatism' and the 'failure' of public schools: The origins of NCLB
The NCLB Act has risen from a 'primeval soup' (Kingdon J., in Rudalevige 2003, p27) of education policy to raise standards in America's public schools that has spanned several decades. Although many of the components of the Act contain little that is completely new, what is unusual is how the Act managed to achieve widespread bipartisan support from Congress. Traditionally the federal government, and Republican administrations, in particular, has avoided much direct influence in educational initiatives, particularly as federal funds only contribute about 7% of a state's total educational revenue (Hochschild 2003) . In order to appreciate this unprecedented level of federal interest in educational achievement in the context of the No Child Left Behind Act, it is important to recognise that standards in America's public schools have long been under scrutiny. The launch of Sputnik in 1957 by the USSR had far reaching repercussions and created pressure on schools to raise academic standards, as well as enrolment on mathematics, science and foreign language courses (Ravitch 1995) . Vol. 20, No. 4 (July 2005): 507-524 (NCEE 1983) which was eroding the American public school system: 'If an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war' (NCEE 1983, p3) While the emphasis on raising standards can be traced back to at least the 1980s, federal interest in public school accountability, coupled with high stakes testing and elements of school choice has been evident in education policy reforms ever since. Consequently, the No Child Left Behind Act 'collected and encompassed proposals advanced in theory and substance for years, accrediting Ronald Regan-, George H W Bush-and Bill Clinton-era initiatives into a single bill' (Rudalevige 2003, p24) .
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Having established the key developments surrounding the inception and content of this new piece of legislation, the following section will consider how some of the accountability measures demanded under No Child Left Behind are working in practice during the early days of the Act.
Making Adequate Yearly Progress: concerns over rules for student subgroups
On the one hand raising the achievement of students in all America's public schools would appear to be both equitable and praiseworthy. However, some of the implications 'This is an electronic version of an article published in The Journal of Education Policy . 20, No. 4 (July 2005): 507-524 6 of NCLB's strict accountability rules and sanctions, in particular those that apply to student subgroups, could result in great numbers of schools and their students being labelled as failing. One of the strengths of the Act is that, as its very title suggests, it demands that the academic progress of every child, regardless how able, be open to scrutiny. However, the reason that many commentators and practitioners take issue with this, is that the Act also states very clearly that not only is every child expected to make progress, they must make sufficient progress to achieve minimum competency levels within 12 years of the Act's inception. According to Linn, one of the flaws with the 100% proficiency target is in its expectation that all schools must achieve the 100% levels, even though the number of schools who are actually at those levels today is very small. In other words, he argues that 'we should not set a goal for all schools that is so high that no school has yet achieved it ' (2003, p4) .
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As NCLB does not mandate specific annual progress targets towards full proficiency, every state is required to chart their own timeline for making Adequate Yearly Progress, so that by 2014 each student, and student subgroup, achieves at or above the state's proficiency levels. The Act, however, does specify that students must make annual incremental progress towards full proficiency. The temptation, of course, is that states will set their AYP targets very low, focusing for example on basic skills tests (Hess 2003 , McNeill 2000 , Haney 2000 . According to Popham (2004) , such incremental progress would mean that many schools would have to raise the number of 'at proficiency' students by 5 or 6 percentage points annually. For these schools, sustaining such year on year increases could result in many of them failing to meet AYP targets within a few years. Indeed, according to Lee, the progress rates of many schools would have to It also means that only about half of the school's students have to be proficient by the end of 2007, leaving the remaining 50%, presumably students of lower ability, or those with Limited English Proficiency, to achieve these levels in the remaining 7 years of the Act.
Additionally, in 7 of the timeline's 12 years, no annual progress at all is required. The justification for leaving larger jumps in the numbers of students achieving proficiency levels until later on in the Act's lifetime would seem sensible. One of reasons why many schools which would otherwise be successful on state accountability measures, might be deemed to be failing under NCLB, is due to the Act's strict rules for student subgroups. While few would disagree that challenging the progress of groups of students who have traditionally done less well in school is praiseworthy; the issue lies with the expectation that these students must also meet the demanding AYP proficiency targets otherwise their schools will receive stiff penalties. According to Kane and Staiger, the use of subgroup rules is 'counter productive in test-based accountability systems ' (2003, p152) , while Linn argues that 'the goals that NCLB sets for student achievement would be wonderful if they could be reached, but, unfortunately, they are quite unrealistic, so much so, that they are apt to do more to demoralise educators than to inspire them' (Linn 2003, p10) .
That 100% of students are required to reach full proficiency levels, when relatively few do at present, is to some commentators unworkable, not least because of the way that disadvantaged groups of students are unevenly distributed in America's schools. These In New Jersey, where school funding is among the most equitable in the whole of the United States, mainly as a result of judicial intervention over the last two decades, students in the poorest school districts do receive a greater proportion of state funding and per pupil expenditure than those in the wealthiest districts (table 1) . Notice also the relatively low proportion of funding that is provided by the federal government, typically around 3%. It is this funding stream that is directly linked to the NCLB sanctions. New Jersey is an interesting example of a state that has sought to eliminate inequities in school funding, while attempting to ensure adequate for provision for students who attend schools in the poorest districts. How the NCLB accountability targets impact upon the State's attempts to provide the 'through and efficient' education demanded under its constitution will be considered below.
State testing and school accountability
Since 1978, students in New Jersey have been assessed in grades 3, 6 and 9 or 11 in reading and mathematics. Over the past two decades, the testing regime has been revised and updated to include basic skills tests, curriculum content standards, accountability measures, public reporting of district level scores and high school graduation tests transfer their children to other schools in the district, while the school will continue to receive technical assistance with its curriculum and teaching programmes.
In the following sections we look more closely at the key characteristics of these schools.
By comparing these 'failing' schools with other schools in New Jersey, and by taking into account contextual features of these schools, we consider the extent to which the sanctions demanded under No Child Left Behind can be justified. In several respects, few differences seem apparent between the schools not making AYP, and designated as 'failing', and the remainder of New Jersey's schools. For example, all schools report similar attendance rates, proportions of students with disabilities and teachers with comparable salaries and levels of experience. However, more often, the schools which fail to make AYP appear to be similar to the poorer Abbott schools, particularly on indicators that may be considered as proxies for poverty. For example, compared with New Jersey schools overall and the schools labelled as 'other', both
The characteristics of New Jersey's schools
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Abbott schools and those that failed to make AYP have smaller proportions of students who speak English as their first language at home, but higher student mobility rates and more students with limited proficiency to speak English (LEP). Interestingly, although the student suspension rate appears to be higher in Abbott and 'failing' schools, the student exclusion rate is slightly higher in schools designated as 'other'. However, the proportion of students who are excluded from all schools in New Jersey is relatively small and slight trends like those seen here ought to be treated with caution. Vol. 20, No. 4 (July 2005) 
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The apparent relationship between whether a school is located in a wealthy or poor district and its achievement on state proficiency tests is not restricted to the characteristics outlined above, but appears to be confirmed by the distribution of schools presented in table 3 below. Three-quarters of New Jersey's failing schools are located in the least wealthy, or category A districts, while only around 12% are located in the medium to high wealth areas (categories C or above). Another concern raised by some critics of NCLB is that the strict rules for student subgroups would mean that students from these groups would be over-represented in poorer or failing schools. These concerns are considered below. However, the New Jersey school report card, from which much of the data used in this analysis was retrieved, provides little detail on the demographic make-up of New Jersey's schools. In order to obtain some estimation of the proportion of students who may be from the various student subgroups, it is necessary to use data derived from the school's reporting of the numbers of students from each subgroup who participated in state-wide tests, such as the Grade Eight Proficiency Assessment (GEPA). Unfortunately, this is an imperfect measure as it only tells us about the composition of the students in that grade, rather than about the school as a whole. In addition, for reasons of confidentiality, the New Jersey 
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school report card datasets suppress student numbers in cases where cell sizes are lower than ten. This means that for a cohort of 160 students, if fewer than ten students were from a Hispanic background, the numbers of Hispanic students would not be displayed.
Where this happens, it is often possible to calculate the values for these suppressed cells by taking into account the numbers of students in the other student sub-groups, where this is not the case the numbers of students had to be estimated. Table 4 presents the percentage of students from the main student subgroups who participated in the GEPA literacy tests in 2003. 192  57  330  46  1297  9  1664  17  White  192  10  331  12  1298  72  1666  59  Hispanic  192  29  330  37  1297  9  1664  15  Asian  192  2  332  2  1297  7  1666  6  General Education  193  78  333  76  1306  83  1676  82  SEN  193  13  333  14  1306  14  1676  14  LEP  193  7  333  8  1306  3  1676  4  Economically  disadvantaged   193  74  333  75  1306  15  1676  28 Note: the total number of schools differs from those in the tables above for two reasons, in some schools small cell sizes are suppressed and had to be excluded, also earlier tables include schools with younger students who did not sit GEPA Schools categorised here as 'other', that is schools which were neither designated as Abbott nor schools that failed to make AYP, tested lower proportions of students from the African-American and Hispanic communities and higher proportions of students from the white community. These differences can, in fact be quite staggering. For example, in all of New Jersey's public schools, while around 17% of students who were assessed using the GEPA were from the African-American community, almost 60% of these students were being taught in schools that were failing to meet state standards, according to NCLB. On the other hand only around 10% of students being assessed in these 'failing' schools were white. Similar inequities can be found in the distribution of students from economically disadvantaged homes, who again were concentrated in schools that failed to demonstrate Adequate Yearly Progress towards full proficiency. In New Jersey, students who do not follow special education programmes will follow the 'general education' route. The proportions of these students are lower in the Abbott schools and in those that failed to make AYP.
Testing higher proportions of certain student sub-groups in 'failing' schools is only really an issue if these students actually achieve lower results. Using the GEPA literacy test as an example, table 5 shows the proportions of students from the various subgroups who achieved or surpassed proficiency levels in 2003. Students from the African-American and Hispanic communities were less likely to reach minimum proficiency levels on the GEPA literacy assessment than students from white families. Students with LEP, SEN and from economically disadvantaged homes also had relatively low success rates on this test. It is also apparent from table 6, that these less successful students are concentrated in the least wealthy school districts. For example, in the 159 district A schools, less than 10% of students came from a white background. This contrasts with schools in more wealthy districts where the school population is overwhelmingly white. Vol. 20, No. 4 (July 2005): 507-524 So on the one hand, New Jersey has established a seemingly equitable school system, particularly where control and change can make an impact at the institutional level, such as ensuring higher levels of funding for schools in less wealthy districts and similar distributions of experienced and salaried teachers. However, differences are revealed in the demographic make-up of New Jersey's schools which appear to confirm some of the fears of commentators who claim that NCLB, rather than making all schools accountable for student progress regardless of the composition of their intake, has resulted in schools in poorer districts with large proportions of students from minority and disadvantaged communities being labelled as failures. This absence of value-added measures of school success which take account of the prior attainment of students as well as their background characteristics, is important. We know from school effectiveness research both in the USA and the UK that the school accounts for a relatively small proportion of the variation in school academic outcomes, typically 8-20% and this includes error components, with by far the largest variation in outcome being attributed to student background characteristics (Jencks 1972 , Reynolds 1994 , Sammons et al 1995 . Relying solely on uncontextualised raw test scores as a means of allocating success and failure to schools, fails to take account of important differences between the types of students who attend these schools, this, in turn, may result in otherwise successful schools being unfairly labelled as failing. 
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The following section takes these background characteristics into account when developing a value-added assessment of school achievement in New Jersey which will allow us to look more closely at schools that fail to meet state standards and consider the evidence for their apparent underachievement.
New Jersey's failing schools?
The dataset for all the schools that made Adequate Yearly Progress during the first two years of No Child Left Behind in New Jersey was used to create a model which, by taking into account both school and student characteristics, was used predict performance in each of the state's proficiency assessments. This model was then used to predict the test outcomes for schools that did not make AYP in this period. For brevity, only the model relating to achievement in the Grade Eight Proficiency Assessment in literacy (GEPAL)
is described here, although the models produced for the other state assessments revealed similar patterns. The most powerful model related the proportion of students who achieved proficiency levels or higher in the GEPA(L) to a range of variables which may be considered to be proxies for poverty, such as the proportion of students tested who come from economically disadvantaged homes, and the relative distribution of local sources of funding for schools. The model coefficients for the multiple linear regression analysis are given in table 7 below. 
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Around 72% of the variance in test scores can be explained by the variables listed above.
Using this model, it is possible to calculate the predicted scores for the 112 schools that failed to make AYP but tested students using the GEPA(L) and, by comparing the difference between their predicted and actual scores, to consider the extent to which these schools are underachieving. In this study, schools were designated as underachieving if the z-score of the difference between their predicted and actual scores was less than -1.
Consider, for example school A which had failed to make Adequate Yearly Progress for two consecutive years and whose parents were being given the opportunity to move their children to other schools in that district. In this school, around 52% of students achieved proficiency levels or higher in the GEPA(L), while our model predicted that 40% of students would achieve this level. This means that, on this model, students in this school actually did better than expected, when the variables listed in table 7 were taken into account. Therefore, on this measure, there is no evidence to suggest that this school was underachieving. In fact, 53% of the 112 schools which, on raw score measures were labelled as failing under No Child Left Behind were, when background characteristics are taken into account, actually achieving higher sores than expected and therefore incorrectly labelled as failing. On the other hand, consider school B. This school is located in a relatively wealthy FG category district. The school was making AYP and, with 62% of students achieving proficiency levels or above on GEPA(L), was not subject to any of NCLB sanctions. However, on our value-added model, over 78% of students should have been working at or above proficiency levels -so on this measure, this seemingly successful school was actually 'underachieving'. such as students from economically disadvantaged homes and who come from the African-American community. On the other hand, schools located in the more wealthy school districts were more likely to serve larger communities of white students who were performing at higher levels on the state assessments. These schools were more likely to meet New Jersey's accountability targets. The use of a value added model to account for the failure of schools to make AYP revealed that around 50% of schools were incorrectly labelled as failing and, it could be argued, being unfairly subjected to the punitive sanctions that are administered to schools that fail to make AYP for two consecutive years.
However, it has to be remembered that these are still early days. The need to take a longitudinal perspective on the development of this Act is crucial. If the legislation is actually seen to make an impact on the achievement of the lowest achieving groups of students then perhaps its dissenters will be encouraged to think again. Even so, how No
Child Left Behind will continue to work in practice does remain to be seen. Some commentators foresee a shift from the current relatively coercive accountability measures that underpin the first manifestations of the Act, to 'softer' measures in which the consequences of failing to meet annual accountability targets will be less severe (Hess The use of the Act's 'safe-harbour' provisions may also be developed to allow increased flexibility in demonstrating AYP, particularly for some student sub-groups. 
